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1. Introduction 
Economic growth raises income and wealth and promotes financial intermediation. On the 
other hand, financial intermediation facilitates economic growth, since better financial 
intermediation raises the returns to investment. 
In the process of economic growth, many informal financial schemes are incorporated into 
a more formal, well organized, national financial system. One of the central problems of economic 
development is how to tap the saving of the households in the informal and rural sectors to finance 
industrial development (Myint, 1964, p. 128; McKinnon, 1973). Thus, there is continued, intense 
interest in the design of financial institutions that can attract the accumulated wealth of the small, 
rural saver. 
In this paper we will study the development of an important informal financial intermediary 
in Japan, the rotating savings and credit association (RoSCA) called the Mujin (ko) or the 
Tanomoshi-ko. Mujins have survived until today (in the form of "Second-Tier" regional banks) from 
the traditional, pre-Modern era. That they have survived from the pre-Modern period suggests that 
these institutions may serve an economically useful purpose. As we will show later, although small, 
Mujins have traditionally provided funds to small- and medium-sized firms in the local sectors of 
the Japanese economy. In 1915, the Japanese Ministry of Finance first passed laws to regulate the 
Mujin. Soon after World War n, the government reorganized the Mujins as mutual (Sogo) banks, 
and the banks started accepting deposits. Only a few years ago, these mutual banks were reorganized 
into the so-called "Second-Tier" regional banks.1 In the early 1990s, these regional banks were 
xThere are today over 50 "Second-Tier" regional banks in Japan, but they hold less than 
10 percent of total deposits. 
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especially hard-hit by the bad loan problems arising from the burst of Japan's asset price bubble. 
RoSCAs are found all over the world, and much has been written about them (Bouman, 
1977; Geertz, 1962; Campbell and Ahn, 1962). The features of Japan's Mujins have much in 
common with those in other parts of the globe. There are several reasons why a study of the 
Japanese Mujins may be of interest. First, few accounts of Japan's RoSCAs exist in the English 
language, in contrast to the fact that RoSCAs in many other countries including Korea and Taiwan 
are well-documented in English (Besley and Levenson, 1996). Second, an analysis of the Mujin is 
important because of its interesting financial mechanism and of its role in everyday finance in pre-
Modern and post-Restoration Japan. Third, the process of transforming the Mujin into a modern 
corporate form is interesting from both economic and political perspectives. From the political 
perspective, the Ministry of Finance (MOF), assisted by the Bank of Japan, took the initiative and 
successfully attained its bureaucratic objective of incorporating the Mujin into the formal Japanese 
financial sector. 
The policy implications of our history of the Mujin would be the following. As we show, 
the Mujins relied on monitoring mechanisms enforced by kinship, religions, and local community 
ties. As the Mujins became larger, more members of the Mujins were inevitably total strangers, and 
moral hazard problems increased. Thus, over time the Japanese Ministry of Finance increased its 
regulation of the Mujins. 
The Ministry of Finance could be justified in trying to contain the Mujin institutions under 
its control and modernizing them, so that the common people would not suffer from dubious 
practices prevalent at these institutions. From 1930 to 1990, there hardly were any Mujin 
bankruptcies. Thus, the Ministry of Finance's objectives were well achieved. Or, we can say that 
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the objectives were too well achieved. For, one cause of the present financial turmoil in Japan has 
been that banks, including banks originated from the Mujin, have been excessively tamed by the 
banking regulations of the Ministry. These banks have become accustomed to relying on 
administrative guidance so much that they have lost their sense of initiative and independent 
responsibility for their financial decisions. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2 to 4, we describe the origins, the 
development, and the workings of the Mujin. In Section 5, we describe how the theory of RoSCAs 
can be applied to the Mujin. In Section 6, we provide some evidence that lower income people made 
more extensive use of the Mujin than higher income people. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Pre-Modern Origins of the Mujin 
The Mujin is a Japanese form of a rotating saving and credit association. Members of the 
Mujin contribute funds and can win the pot by drawing or by bidding. The Mujin originated from 
Buddhist traditions, coming from India, China, and Korea, and finally to Japan. In Japanese 
historical records, the word "Mujin" first appeared in 1255, but at that time referred to pawn-shop 
financing. Later the word was used synonymously with Tanomoshi, which is Japanese for rotating 
savings and credit associations (RoSCA).2 By the Muromachi period (1338-1467), the institutional 
form of the Mujin=Tanomoshi-ko had been firmly established. 
In Buddhist teachings, Mujin means inexhaustible, something like the widow's curse. 
Tanomoshi-ko means a trustworthy community. In principle, Tanomoshi provided financing without 
2We owe the following descriptions to Zenkoku Sogo Ginko Kyokai (1971), Miyamoto 
and Takashima (1991) and Mori (1982). 
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collateral and without interest payments. When commercial lenders did not provide sufficient 
lending to the poor, a group of people gathered, contributed a certain sum of money, and extended 
loans to the needy. Even during Japan's pre-Modern period, these rotating savings and credit 
associations were considered to be helpful, even ingenious, schemes of financing. 
The traditional system of the Mujin-Ko or Tanomoshi-Ko contract consisted of the following 
elements. 
(1) Initiators or originators of Ko were called "Parents." 
(2) The initiator gathered a few to more than ten people who constituted the membership of 
the Ko. 
(3) The members agreed on the terms of the operation. 
(4) Members attended regularly the meeting of the Ko and had to make a contribution of a 
certain amount of money. 
(5) The money collected was paid out as a "pot" to a person determined by chance drawing 
or by bidding. 
(6) In case the money was paid out by chance drawing, the members who obtained a pot 
could not participate in any additional drawing. The members were required to give contributions 
to the meeting each time. Some interest could be added. 
(7) After everybody obtained a loan, the Ko would dissolve. 
(8) The interest was adjusted so that late receivers of the pot contributed less in total than 
what they received in total, when interest payments from early borrowers are included. 
The Tokugawa (Edo) period started in 1603 and more than two hundred fifty years of 
political stability followed. Temples and shrines organized the Mujin so that a person who had won 
the pot in an earlier round did not have to contribute afterwards. This arrangement made the Ko 
more like a gamble than a mutual-help financial organization. A person who won early could take 
the funds and leave. Even the central (Shogunate) and local (Daimyo) governments were tempted 
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to hold Mujin-type raffles for the sake of raising revenues. 
Some writers emphasize the use of the Ko for social welfare purposes. During the Kyo-ho 
(1716-36) reform, the poverty of farmers escalated. After the following famine and earthquake, 
Miura Baien opened the Charity-Mujin in 1756 which gave funds to members who had poor 
harvests. The timing of the distribution of the pot was set to meet the needs of the indigent. In fact, 
those who were faced with disaster often asked their friends to form a Mujin. The disaster victim 
would then be allowed to draw from the pot first. Thus, a significant element of charity was 
involved. 
In 1868, the Tokugawa period ended, replaced by the Meiji Restoration, and a central 
government based on the Emperor's ultimate authority was established. The Restoration was 
characterized by relative political stability in spite of the great change in regime. Free trade was 
forcefully imposed by foreign countries, which facilitated Japan's rapid modernization. The land tax 
was introduced to secure the basic revenue for the government. The Japanese currency, the yen, was 
introduced in 1871. Banks, credit unions, and the Postal Saving System were all imported from the 
Western countries. The Mujin or the Tanomoshi was the only financial institution that had survived 
into the Meiji period from the old, traditional Japanese regime. 
The Mujin remained virtually the only traditional financial institution carried over from the 
Tokugawa period. Despite the introduction of banks, savings and loans, and other modern financial 
institutions from the West, most ordinary people, and especially rural dwellers, did not used these 
modern institutions. Rather, the Mujins continued to be popular. Farmers formed Mujins to obtain 
funds to buy equipment. Craftsmen often formed Mujins among those in their trade. Many village 
dwellers formed Mujins, not for financing, but simply to provide an opportunity for social gathering 
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and friendship. However, after the Meiji Restoration, there arose many informal, but commercial, 
groups that exploited the Mujin method, not for the sake of religious activities or mutual help but 
for the sake of profit. 
In the early Meiji years, there emerged Mujin enterprises that were permanent in the sense 
that they did not dissolve after one cycle of the Mujin and were commercial in the sense that they 
were completely driven by profit motives. In particular, around the turn of the nineteenth century, 
numerous Mujin in the form of partnerships or joint-stock companies were established. For 
example, in 1901, Yamato Kai started with contributions by 150 members, 5 yen for every 20 days. 
This was called the Osaka type, which had less of an element of gambling. 
These commercial Mujins were usually started by entrepreneurs. The Yamato Kai was 
started by Kankichi Kobayashi, who went on to start over 20 Mujins throughout Japan. Many of 
these Mujins differed considerably in style from the traditional Mujins. For example, in some of the 
new Mujins, not all members were allowed to draw from the pot. In extreme cases, none of the 
members could draw from the pot and all of the contributions were loaned, with interest, to the 
entrepreneur-originator of the Mujin. The only similarity that these new Mujins had with the 
traditional type was that members had to make contributions in regular intervals. Because of their 
increasingly commercial nature, starting from Hiroshima prefecture in 1898, many prefectures 
imposed regulations on the Mujin business. 
3. The Mujin Finance Law 
The Ministry of Finance (MOF) and The Bank of Japan made studies on the ongoing 
practices of the Mujin around 1915 and pointed out the advantages and the disadvantages of the 
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Mujin. According to the Ministry of Finance, around that time there were 831 units that operated 
the Mujin, and their total capital amounted to 20.3 million yen. Of the 831 units, over 80 percent 
were incorporated as joint stock companies. 
Advantages of Mujin: 
(1) Low income people do not like new methods of financing that have been imported from 
Western countries. 
(2) Pawn borrowing and shark borrowing are not what low income people prefer. These 
methods often charge prohibitive rates of interest. 
(3) People do not have, however, psychological resistance to the Mujin, the traditional 
means of finance. 
Disadvantages of Mujin: 
(1) It is difficult to force those who obtain the pot at an early draw to make further 
contributions. 
(2) There are occasions of unfair drawing. 
(3) There are often unfair differences in the implicit interest rates. 
(4) A very high rate of interest may emerge by bidding, which may make the Mujin 
usurious. 
(5) The timing of lending is inflexible. 
(6) The accounting procedure is nontransparent. 
Some of the above alleged advantages and disadvantages of the Mujin lack sound 
economic foundations. For example, Besley, Coate, and Loury (1993) have shown that under a 
"bidding" type RoSC A, early acquirers of the pot bid more. These higher bids by earlier recipients 
resemble interest payments, and in this sense, a bidding RoSCA can be likened to a loan market. 
Moreover, Besley, Coate, and Loury (1993) have shown that with heterogeneous individuals, the 
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higher bids can serve as a sorting mechanism, giving the pot to the individual with the highest 
valuation first. If a given individual greatly values receiving the pot early, the individual will bid 
high, and his implicit interest rate will be high. Thus, implicit interest rates will differ by bidder, and 
very high interest rates may emerge as an equilibrium outcome. Different and high interest rates may 
not necessarily be unfair. 
Justified by economic foundations or not, the Meiji and later governments tried to strengthen 
the disadvantageous aspects and keep the advantageous aspects by making the Mujin a more modern 
institution. The Ministry of Finance drafted a regulatory act that prohibited dubious practices and 
modernized the accounting systems of the Mujin. Many Mujin companies strongly opposed the 
enactment of the Mujin-Gyo-Ho (Mujin Finance Law). 
In 1915, the Mujin Finance Law passed the Diet and was soon implemented. The definition 
of the Mujin was clarified. The amount of the pot, the amount of the premium (contribution), the 
duration of the operation, and the number of members came under strict limits. For example, 
according to the attachment to the Law, a Mujin should not last more than 5 years, one unit of pot 
should be under 10,000 yen, and a company should not operate more than 100 groups. The most 
effective regulation in the Law was that the Mujin enterprise should be organized as a company, and 
that 15,000 yen should be paid in as capital. 
It may appear odd that the government will impose a capital requirement on RoSCAs. After 
all, in a traditional RoSCA, the money collected each month is immediately disbursed to the 
members. The capital requirement makes the post-1915 Mujin fundamentally different from a 
"pure" RoSCa, in which funds are cleared each period. As mentioned, however, by 1915, most 
Japanese RoSCAs had become commercially-oriented. Some new Mujins were started by 
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between savers and borrowers. Gradually, after the passing of the Mujin law, the Osaka style 
became more dominant. In 1939, all except three prefectures adopted the Osaka style. 
In 1935, the MOF found that there were more than three thousand different schedules relating 
to the timing of the draw, and payments. The MOF attempted to unify these schedules at the 
prefecture level, but in 1939 there were still more than one thousand schedules. 
The rate of return to participants in the Mujin is fairly complicated because such variables 
as the timing of the pot (kitty) payment, the auction price, contributions before the payment, and 
contributions after the payment all affect the returns. 
For the purposes of standardizing the schedules, the MOF provided formulas for calculating 
the internal rates of interest. For the lottery type or "random" RoSCA of the Osaka style, let us 
introduce the following notation: 
Payment of the pot: A 
contributions before the payment: B 
additional contributions (over B) after the payment: B' 
the total number of periods: m (the number of periods at which the Mujin 
contract ends). 
the timing of the payment: n 
the interest rate on bank deposits: i 
the implicit rate of borrowing: r. 
The implicit, effective rate of borrowing, r, was calculated by equating the present values 
of the payment and that of the contributions calculated at the end of the Mujin contract (Zenkoku 
Sogo Ginko Kyokai, 1970), period m. (Campbell and Ahn calculate similar implicit rates of interest 
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entrepreneurs to fund their other businesses. These entrepreneurs discovered that funds can be raised 
more easily if their new financial organs resembled more traditional financial institutions, familiar 
to the common people. Thus, these organs adopted the monthly contributions scheme of the 
traditional Mujin. However, drawings were not allowed or were limited to a few insiders. Other 
new Mujins essentially operated like the traditional Mujins, but had professional entrepreneur-
managers who collected administrative/management fees from the members. Thus, by 1915, most 
Mujins operated differently from a pure RoSCA. 
The capital requirement in effect served as a "bond" to make the entrepreneur operate the Mujins 
more honestly and efficiently. 
The Mujin finance law made withdrawing from the Mujin more systematic. Traditionally, 
early withdrawal caused problems for the Mujin, since a fall in membership meant that suppliers of 
funds became more scarce. According to the new law, one could only withdraw if appropriate 
successors were found. 
In the traditional Mujin, there were two ways of calculating contributions and payments from 
the pot, the Tokyo and Osaka styles. In both styles, the pot was distributed each period by lottery. 
The Tokyo style was the method that kept the contributions unchanged before and after the period 
when the participant received the payment. The Osaka style was the method that increased the 
amount of contributions after the period when the participant received the payment. Since an earlier 
pot payment meant an economic advantage for the member, the Tokyo style involved the element 
of luck or gambling. In contrast, in the Osaka style, an earlier pot payment was not necessarily 
advantageous, because the recipient had to pay higher contributions for a longer period. Thus, the 
Osaka style was closer in spirit to the traditional role of financial intermediaries, transferring funds 
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for Kye or Mujins in Korea.) 
If one neglects the second order terms, one obtains, 
or, 
and therefore, 
where Bm+B'(m-n) is the total premium, the term in the { } bracket is the number of months of 
premium payments, and A(m-n) is the length of borrowing. Therefore, the effective rate of 
borrowing or receiving A is given by: 
r= Total Premium - Amount of + (Accumulated Months * Bank Deposit 
Payments the Pot of Premium Payments Interest Rate) 
Length of Borrowing 
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In order to determine whether participating in the Mujin is more profitable than making a 
bank deposit, the r above should be compared to the bank deposit interest rate, i, the opportunity cost 
of funds. The problem for a Mujin participant is of course that he does not know n, the time when 
he obtains the pot. r is therefore uncertain ex ante.3 
The influence of the MOF was not limited to the unification of contribution-payment 
schedules and interest rates. The Ministry of Finance also played an important role in consolidating 
the numerous Mujins. 
After the passing of the Mujin Finance Law, the number of Mujins fell from 2363 to only 
136. In 1915, the Mujin came under the control of the Ministry of Finance. In 1931, the Mujin-
Finance Law was amended, and the Mujin was permitted to exist only as joint stock companies. 
After the financial crisis of 1927, and consequent financial bank-runs, the Ministry of 
Finance tightened its control and tried to limit the number of banks and Mujin companies. During 
the Second World War, the Ministry of Finance attempted to reduce the number of Mujin to one in 
each prefecture, to 47. Sometimes Mujin companies were hesitant to be merged, but the MOF 
argued that mergers were necessary to increase the efficiency of the banking system, and that 
banking efficiency was necessary to win the war against the United States. During the war period, 
an important concern of the government was to increase saving rates. Thus, although deposits were 
3However, given that each participant knows the number of 
group members and the length of the RoSCA, m, each participant 
can form an expectation of n. For example, in a RoSCA of three 
players lasting three periods, the expected value of n is 2. 
Thus, given expected n, the expected real interest rate can be 
calculated. See Besley, Coate, and Loury (1994) for a more 
general exposition. 
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not allowed de jure for Mujin companies, by various devices it was made possible for the Mujin to 
de facto accept saving deposits. 
4. Post-war Development of the Mujin. 
After the Second World War, Japan's economy and financial markets were in turmoil. There 
emerged many small finance companies (called shokusan kaisha, meaning "industry promoting 
companies") that provided funds to small and medium-sized companies. After paying-in deposits 
of at least 50 yen for 60 times, a client could obtain 10,000 yen in credit. These finance companies 
differed from the Mujin in that a group did not need to be organized, and borrowing was possible 
without lotteries or auctions. The financing conducted by these schemes was called Minashi (bogus) 
Mujin. These "bogus" Mujin soon became very popular, and the government amended the Mujin-
Finance law to include these new finance companies. The passing of this amendment started the 
transformation of the Mujins from their original form as a rotating credit association to more general 
financial intermediaries. 
Officials at the General Head Quarters (GHQ: the popular name of the Supreme Commander 
of Allied Forces that was occupying Japan after World War 11) were not sympathetic to Mujin 
operations, and prevented Mujins from accepting demand deposits. GHQ officials did not 
understand Mujins well, and regarded them not as a means of finance, but as a means of gambling. 
GHQ officials wanted to limit deposit activities to only commercial banks, which was the situation 
in the United States (Zenkoku Sogo Ginko Kyokai, pp. 147-8). 
In practice, however, the post-war Mujins played an important role in providing finance for 
small and medium-sized enterprises. However, as the Japanese economy developed, some of the 
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provisions of the post-war Mujin Law became too restrictive. For example, lending was usually 
limited to within a prefecture, and there were strict limits placed on where excess funds could be 
invested. 
The National Mujin Association therefore asked the government to draft a new law that 
would make the Mujin companies more like small-scale banks. Small and medium-sized enterprises 
were also dissatisfied with the loan behavior of the large banks, and needed banks that dealt more 
exclusively with small- and medium-sized firms. To appease the GHQ, the name Sogo Ginko or 
"mutual banks" was chosen to refer to the transformed Mujins. The Sogo Ginko Ho, or Mutual 
Bank Act passed the Diet on May 1951. Most Mujins were converted to Sogo banks in 1956. 
However, informal Mujins have continued to operate in Japan. These informal Mujins meet 
regularly among 10 to 30 people and appear to serve an important social function. For example, 
even in the late 1990s, over several hundred informal Mujins operated in the Aizu region. 
The purpose of the Mutual Bank Act was to "provide smooth financing to the (common) 
people and to promote the savings of the (common) people (Article 1)." The activities of the Mutual 
Banks included among others (i) accepting premiums or contributions with a contract to pay during 
or at the end of the contract — the essence of the traditional Mujin business; (ii) accepting deposits 
or term deposits; and (iii) extending loans and discounting bills. Items (ii) and (iii) were activities 
that had only been partially allowed previously. There were still, however, size and geographic 
restrictions on loans. 
It is usually believed that the Japanese government is so strong that it can realize whatever 
it intends to accomplish. During the Second World War, most of the attempts by the MOF to 
consolidate the Mujins were realized. After the war, however, there were some cases where merger 
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attempts were unsuccessful. 
For example, in 1978, the executive directors of Kansai Sogin in Osaka voted to merge with 
the gigantic Sumitomo (commercial) Bank, which already had sent six executives (among the total 
eleven) to Kansai Sogin. The MOF encouraged the move as a way of achieving efficiency in the 
banking sector. However, labor unions, branch chief managers, and, moreover, clients of Kansai 
Sogin strongly opposed the merger. A description of their grounds for opposition is worth recording. 
"— I doubt if banks should follow solely the objective of efficiency. The effect on clients 
should be taken into account as well. — There is a difference of philosophy between Sumitomo 
and us. Sumitomo is an institution in which a handful elites take leadership and everybody else 
pursues the same target in perfect order. They live an admirable life, —, but as a human, a uniform, 
stereotyped life. — We are different. We have been helping management of small and medium 
enterprises. Our job is hard, not so fashionable, but we are proud of it." (Goto 1994, p.453).M 
Because of this strong opposition, the Chairman of the National Association of Mutual Banks 
opposed the merger and asked the MOF to settle the situation. It was the first time that the 
Association expressed an opinion on the management policies of an individual participating bank. 
The MOF took the side of the opposition, and the merger failed. 
Since the 1980s, mutual bank mergers were the general trend. Moreover, the transformation 
of the mutual banks into commercial banks was made an important agenda of the government. After 
thirty years of the mutual banking system, the mutual banks in the 1980s performed about the same 
general activities as the general commercial banks. In 1985, the Kinyu Seido Chosakai (Advisory 
Study Council of the Financial System) changed its attitude from keeping the status quo in the 
banking sector to advocating the transformation of the mutual banks into commercial banks. Thus, 
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between 1989 and 1990, all of the mutual banks were transformed into commercial banks. 
5. The Theory of Rotating-Credit Associations. 
An interesting theoretical question is why the Mujins were sustainable as a method of 
finance. What types of economic incentive mechanisms were working in the Mujins, or more 
generally, in rotating Savings and Credit Associations (RoSCA)? A rigorous study of economic 
incentives is given in Besley, Coate and Loury (1993, 1994). In their model, Besley, Coate, and 
Loury (1993, 1994) or BCL, emphasize the following aspects of the RoSCA. 
First, their model predicts that RoSCAs are likely to be small in membership, and their 
members, socially connected. Since those who receive the pot early are effectively in debt to the 
other group members, individuals have an incentive to refuse to honor their membership 
commitment after winning the pot. By forming a RoSCA among a small group of socially connected 
individuals, say among individuals from the same village or occupational guild, these individuals 
are likely to have good information about the reliability of their neighbors and co-workers and can 
enforce sanctions-social and economic-on those who are delinquent without good reason. A 
corrollary is that some limit on the number of members may be socially desirable. In larger groups, 
it becomes more difficult to keep track of defecting members. BCL show that this effect is likely 
to outweigh the intermediation benefits of a larger membership in groups above a certain size. 
Second, their model predicts that RoSCAs are in general, less efficient than credit markets. 
Thus, the development of credit markets would most likely weaken the institution of the RoSCA 
over time, especially if the credit markets are available to all segments of the population. 
Third, their model predicts that RoSCA winnings will be mainly used for the purchases of 
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indivisible durable goods.4 The RoSCAs provide a rule for rationing access to the indivisible good: 
random allocation in a "random" RoSCA and bidding in a "bidding" RoSCA. Thus, the BCL model 
surprisingly predicts that the average RoSCA member is likely to be richer than the average 
population. This is because in developing countries, durable goods purchases are richer than the 
average population. 
In sum, in their mathematical formulation of RoSCAs, Besley, Coate and Loury (1993) show 
that the RoSCA is a desirable device for a group that is socially connected, and that the RoSCA 
improves upon autarky savings of those who do not have access to any other capital market. 
The Mujins share many features with the BCL model. Most traditional Mujins were of the 
random type, and proceeds from the draws were used to fund significant, idiosyncratic expenses such 
as new farming equipment, start-up funds for businesses, and weddings. Initially, members of the 
Mujin were socially connected. Mujin members were often from the same village, craft, or 
workplace. However, as the Mujins became more commercially oriented, the Mujins expanded their 
membership, and increasingly, members were strangers. Thus, consistent with the first prediction 
of the BCL model, enforcement problems arose, and some individuals did not keep their 
4Calomiris and Rajaraman (1998) take issue with BCLs prediction that RoSCA 
participants are mostly those saving for nondivisible durable goods. Calomiris and Rajaraman 
argue that the actual operations of most real-world RoSCAs do not conform to BCLs typified 
example in which members bid for the pot at the time the RoSCAs are formed. In fact, in most 
real-world RoSCAs, members bid concurrently with the drawings. Calomiris and Rajaraman 
argue that the durable goods saving motive cannot explain the fact that actual allocations 
received by participants are subject to ex post variation via the bidding process; the ex post 
variation in the allocations suggest an important insurance feature of the RoSCAs. In contrast to 
BCL, Calomiris and Rajaraman add that evidence of RoSCA participation by the poor in 
developing countries is very widespread. This is because the potential insurance function of the 
RoSCAs tends to be the most important for the poor, who are over-represented in occupations 
with large uninsurable wealth shocks. 
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commitment to pay into the RoSCA after they had won the pot. The Japanese Ministry of Finance 
recognized the difficulty in forcing those who obtained the pot at an early draw to make further 
contributions, and in the 1915 law placed strict limits on the number of Mujin members. 
We also showed that as the common people gained access to the banking system through the 
Sogo banks, the Mujins declined in popularity, although they were not outlawed. This is consistent 
with BCLs second prediction taht the development of credit markets will weaken the RoSCA. 
6. Mujin Use by Low Income People. 
The third prediction of the BCL model is that the average RoSCA member is likely to be 
richer than the average population. Levenson and Besley (1996) present evidence for Taiwan that 
higher income households are more likely to use RoSCAs, thus supporting the BCL model. To date, 
Levenson and Besley offer the only systematic evidence of RoSCA use. Such systematic evidence 
is not available for Japan prior to the Mujins' conversion to Sogo banks in 1956. However, 
fragmented evidence suggests that in Japan, Mujins were used more extensively by lower income 
households. 
Immediately before the Mujins conversion to Sogo banks, there was a survey taken of Mujin 
activities. The survey found that of the total savings of Japanese households in 1950, 65 percent 
were in banks, 15 percent were in postal savings, 10 percent were in agricultural cooperatives, and 
6 percent were in Mujins. The average "deposits" (contributions minus payments) per person in the 
Mujin were 3183 yen compared to over 10 times that amount per depositor for banks. Thus, it 
appears that on average, Mujin "deposits" were much smaller than bank deposits. 
Since the mid-1960s, surveys have been taken of the Japanese households' saving behavior. 
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The survey of 1967 (Family Saving Survey) found that of the households in the top quartile of 
earnings, 66 percent and 4.8 percent had savings in banks and in the Mujins, respectively.5 Of the 
households in the middle 50 percent of earnings, 46.3 percent and 7.3 percent had savings in banks 
and in the Mujins, respectively. Of the households in the bottom quartile, 31.7 percent and 16 
percent had savings in banks and in the Mujins, respectively. Thus, households with lower income 
tend to use the Mujin more extensively than households with higher income. 
That the average participant in the Mujin was relatively poor suggests that the Mujin may 
also have been used for purposes other than saving for durable goods, such as for insurance. In fact, 
we have shown that originally, Mujins were formed to provide charity to the unfortunate. 
7. Concluding Comments. 
An interesting international aspect of Japan's Mujin is its propagation in Korea and Taiwan. 
Korea has its own RoSCA called Kye. Campbell and Ahn (1962) document the existence of the Kye 
in Korea. Kyes gained popularity after the Korean War. According to them "in June 1959, — out 
of 2,691 households sampled, 1,603 were liable for debts. Approximately eight percent of the 
borrowers obtained their loans from banks. The bulk of the borrowers obtained their loans from 
'individuals and acquaintances'." Campbell and Ahn interpret the last category as consisting of loans 
through Kyes. Besley and Levenson (1996) document the existence of RoSC As in Taiwan called 
the hui. 
Most of the features of the RoSCAs that are found abroad can be found in the Japanese 
5Recall that Mujins have continued to exist informally, even 
after the passage of the Mutual Bank Act in 1951. 
20 
versions. By tracing the history of the Mujin (Tanomoshi) for more than 700 years, we have 
observed many facets of the evolution of financial intermediation at the informal level, the function 
of contingent contract in financial transactions under incomplete information, and the role of the 
government in the formation of the modern financial system. The Japanese government has 
attempted to consolidate, rationalize, and economize the activities of the Mujin. After the Mujin-gyo 
Ho (the Mutual Bank Act) was enacted, Mujin companies and mutual banks were forcefully merged 
and integrated. 
Mujin is a form of traditional finance that combines skillfully the capacity to monitor the 
availability of funds. To cope with indivisibilities of investment and to cope with monitoring 
problems, this system has developed and survived as a surprisingly popular financing system, in spite 
of the simultaneous development of modern financial institutions. 
At first, elements of religion and charity were strong. The information problems of 
monitoring borrowers was alleviated by mutual surveillance within the group; as common members 
of the same Buddhist sect, members could usually trust each other. However, the traditional Mujin 
was limited because the group had to be homogeneous. As the Mujin expanded to include a larger 
number of people, the profit motive and the possibility of fraud entered. 
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